

PRÉSIDENCE
DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE


The French White Paper on defence and national security



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BACKGROUND AND PROCESS



In 1994, after the end of the division of Europe during the Cold War, France undertook a reappraisal of its strategy and force structure. This prepared the decision in 1996 to (i) move to all-professional armed forces, (ii) dismantle its surface-to-surface nuclear missiles and (iii) build up a substantial force projection capability, in keeping with the new strategic situation. Some fifteen years later, the world has radically changed. The post-Cold War era is over. Globalisation now structures international relations. A re-appraisal was required.

In August 2007, the French President set up a Commission entrusted with the crafting of a White Paper on Defence and National Security. The Commission was given full latitude to fulfil its task, without any taboos. The composition of the Commission reflected this innovative approach: in addition to the representatives of the relevant government agencies and of the armed forces, parliamentarians and qualified individuals from academia and strategic think-tanks were actively involved in the work of the Commission along with independent experts and personalities with an industrial background. In a break with past practice, the Commission proceeded with far-ranging publicly televised and on-line hearings of some 52 personalities, from 14 countries and 5 continents. Numerous closed-door consultations were also held. Members of the Commission proceeded with more than twenty visits in the field in defence and national security units and facilities, in France and abroad on the various theatres of operations where French forces are engaged. The Commission's website received more than 250,000 individual visits, bearing witness of the public interest in defence and security affairs; the corresponding on-line forum provided the Commission with useful input. Exchanges with trusted foreign partner-states and

with the European Union and Atlantic Alliance were part of this unprecedentedly comprehensive and open process.

At the outcome of this process, the White Paper substantially redefines French strategy in a 15-year perspective, embracing both defence and national security. It includes foreign security and domestic security, military and civilian means, tools and approaches. It responds to risks emanating from either States or non-State actors. In an all-hazards approach, it deals with active, deliberate threats but also with the security implications of major disasters and catastrophes of a non-intentional nature.

The definition of a comprehensive security strategy is a consequence of the challenges of our times, faced by France together with its allies and partners: the fundamental changes of the age of globalisation are reflected in an in-depth, wide-ranging strategic adaptation.

As was the case for its predecessors of 1972 and 1994, this White Paper will serve as the foundation for downstream multi-year planning and spending decisions. In the autumn of 2008, the draft Defence and Internal Security Multiyear Programme Bills will both be put to Parliament, incorporating the White Paper's findings.

Key findings

1. The world has changed profoundly since the publication of the previous White Paper in 1994, in particular under the impact of globalisation. The formidable acceleration of information exchanges, the increased trade in goods and services as well as the rapid circulation of individuals, have transformed our economic, social and political environment in both positive and negative ways, as well as the paradigms of national and international security. The hierarchy of powers has changed and will continue to evolve. The world is not necessarily more dangerous, but it has become more unstable, more unforeseeable. New crises, in particular from the Middle East to Pakistan have come to the fore and have become more inter-connected. Jihadism-inspired terrorism aims directly at France and Europe, which are in a situation of **greater direct vulnerability**. As we look to the 2025 horizon, France and Europe will fall within the range of ballistic missiles developed by new powers; new risks have appeared, be it intentional in the case of cyber-attacks or non-intentional, such as health-related or environmental crises amplified by the deterioration of the biosphere. The White Paper aims at presenting the strategic appraisal for the next fifteen years to come, and consequences are drawn in order to draft together a new defence and security policy.
2. The major innovation compared to the previous White paper is that the security interests are appraised globally without restricting the analysis to defence issues. A national security strategy is defined in order to provide responses to “*all the risks and threats which could endanger the life of the Nation.*” The scope of national security includes the defence policy, but is not limited to it. In order to better ensure the defence of the interests of France and the mission of protecting its population, the national security strategy calls upon the interior security policy, for anything which is not directly related to individual security of persons and property or law and order, as well as the civil security policy. Other policies such as foreign policy and economic policy also contribute directly to national security.
3. The national security strategy includes five strategic functions which the defence and security forces must master: knowledge and anticipation, prevention, deterrence, protection and intervention. The combination of these five functions must be flexible and evolve over time, adapting to the changes in the strategic environment. The White Paper will therefore be updated before the discussion of each new Military Programme and Interior Security Bills.
4. **Knowledge and anticipation** represent a new strategic function and have become a priority. In a world characterised by uncertainty and instability, knowledge represents our **first line of defence**. Knowledge guarantees our autonomy in

decision-making and enables France to preserve its **strategic initiative**. It is knowledge which must be provided as early on as possible to decision-makers, military commanders and those in charge of internal and civil security in order to go from forecasts to informed action. Intelligence of all kinds, including from space and prospective studies, takes on major importance.

5. **Protection** of both the French population and territory is at the very heart of our strategy because of the existence of new vulnerabilities to which they are directly exposed. The goal is to protect the nation in times of major crisis while increasing its resilience defined as the “*capability of public authorities and the French society to respond to a major crisis and rapidly restore normal functioning.*” Reinforcing resilience requires a change in the means and methods of surveillance used over the national territory including land, sea, air and now space and to develop a more rapid and wider in scope, response capability for French public authorities. Communication and information systems and civil warning systems lie at the centre of the crisis management and preparedness system. One novel aspect is that operational goals in protection missions are now assigned jointly to both internal security services, civil security services and the armed forces. Coordination between civilian and military departments and agencies is one of the fundamental principles of the new strategy.

6. As regards our **conflict prevention and intervention capabilities**, the White Paper provides for the **concentration on a priority geographical axis** from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, the Arab-Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. This axis corresponds to the areas where the risks related to the strategic interests of France and Europe are the highest. The White Paper also takes account of the **growing importance of Asia** for national security and favours both presence and cooperation in this direction from the Indian Ocean. In parallel, France will preserve its prevention and action capabilities on the Western and Eastern sea-boards of the African continent as well as in the Sahel, in particular to fight against trafficking and acts of terrorism. France will radically change the existing system of defence and military cooperation agreements to **evolve toward a partnership between Europe and Africa and cooperation in defence and security** which will favour the development and strengthening of African peace-keeping capabilities. The armed forces will retain sufficient assets in the West-Indies-French Guyana zone to be used for the protection of the Kourou space centre and the fight against narcotics trafficking. The *Gendarmerie* and civil security forces will be reinforced in the DOM-COM (overseas departments and territories). The White Paper also sets forth a series of **guidelines for the intervention of French armed forces on foreign theatres**.

7. Nuclear deterrence remains an essential concept of national security. It is the ultimate guarantee of the security and independence of France. The sole purpose of the nuclear deterrent is to **prevent any State-originating aggression against the vital interests of the nation** wherever it may come from and in whatever shape or form. Given the diversity of situations to which France might be confronted in an age of globalisation, the credibility of the deterrent is based on the ability to provide the President , **with an autonomous and sufficiently wide and diversified range of assets and options.** This requires the modernisation of two components: the sea-based ballistic missile submarine force and the airborne missiles carried by nuclear-capable combat aircraft. Even though there may not be any direct threat of aggression today against France, it is imperative to retain the capability to preserve the freedom of action of our nation if our vital interests are threatened with blackmail. France will have the means to develop its capability as long as nuclear weapons are necessary for its security. However, France has taken the initiative in the area of **nuclear disarmament** and shall continue to do so. France is particularly active in the **fight against the proliferation** of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons as well as the delivery missiles.

8. The European ambition stands as a priority. Making the European Union a major player in crisis management and international security is one of the central tenets of our security policy. France wants Europe to be equipped with the corresponding military and civilian capability. The **White Paper proposes several concrete goals** for European defence in the coming years :

- Set up an **overall intervention capability of 60,000 soldiers**, deployable for one year in a distant theatre with the necessary air and naval forces;
- Achieve the capability to deploy for a significant duration **two or three peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operations** and **several civilian operations** of lesser scope in separate theatres;
- Increase the **European planning and operational capability** both military and civilian, in parallel to the development of interventions outside the European Union;
- Create impetus and restructure the **European defence industry.**

In addition, the White Paper emphasises four priority areas for the **protection of European citizens** : the reinforcement of cooperation in the fight against terrorism and organised crime; the development of European civil protection capabilities; the coordination of the defence against cyber-attack; and the securing of energy and strategic raw materials supply.

Lastly, the White Paper advocates the drafting of a **European White Paper on defence and security**.

9. The White Paper emphasises that the **European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance are complementary**. France is committed to the **renovation of NATO** in particular on the occasion of NATO's 60th anniversary, to be celebrated in 2009.

Europe and the North Atlantic Alliance have changed considerably, since the decision taken by General de Gaulle in 1966 to withdraw French forces from the NATO integrated military command, and since the previous White Paper published in 1994. The European Union has emerged as a major player in the international community. NATO has maintained its responsibility for the collective defence of the allies, as recalled in the Lisbon Treaty, but is also a peacekeeping instrument (Afghanistan, Kosovo). There is no competition between NATO and the European Union – the two are complementary: today we need both to come to grips with the threats and crises.

This reality leads us to advocate the **full participation of France in the structures of NATO**. This evolution will go hand in hand with the reinforcement of the European Union in the area of crisis management and the search for a new balance between Americans and Europeans within NATO. As regards the position of France, the White Paper recalls the **three main principles** in direct continuity with those defined by General de Gaulle : **complete independence of our nuclear forces** ; French authorities must retain full **freedom of assessment**, which implies the absence of automatic military commitment and the maintenance of assets allowing for strategic autonomy in particular by increasing our intelligence capabilities; and lastly, **permanent freedom of decision** which means that **no French forces shall be permanently placed under NATO command in peace time**.

10. The White Paper defines a consistent defence effort based on the **dual concern of improving without delay the availability and modernisation of the most frequently used equipment, and launching programmes related to intelligence and preparation for the future**. It advocates therefore as a priority the reinforcement of the protection of our land, sea and air combat forces (individual soldier protection, armoured vehicles, equipment maintenance, and anti-air and anti-cruise missile protection of our Navy ships). The White Paper also calls for the **launching of new programmes**, during the same timeframe, in particular in the field of knowledge and anticipation (knowledge-based security, observation, electronic intelligence, **early warning**) on land, at sea and in the air with the de-

velopment of surveillance and armed drones, as well as both offensive and defensive cyber-war capabilities.


11. The new format of our armed forces is to be determined on the basis of operational goals decided by the government based on the proposals made by the White Paper Commission. The main force levels proposed are as follows:

- An operational ground force (*Force Opérationnelle Terrestre*) of **88,000 men, enabling a force-projection capability of 30,000** soldiers with six month notice, 5,000 soldiers on permanent operational alert, and the capability to mobilise 10,000 soldiers on the national territory to support civilian authorities in case of a major crisis;
- An aircraft-carrier group including combat, surveillance and rescue aircraft and helicopters, **18 frigates, six SSNs and the capability to deploy one or two naval groups either for amphibious operations or for the protection of sea lines;**
- A joint fleet of **300 combat aircraft**, regrouping the combat aircraft of both the Air Force and the Navy (Rafale and modernised Mirage 2000-D) under the operational command of the Chief of staff of the armies and a single management by the Air Force ; this force will allow for the permanent deployment of 5 squadrons on our national territory and a force projection capability outside of the national territory of 70 combat aircraft with an additional capability of 10 aircraft on permanent alert;


12. France shall devote a major financial effort to its defence, consistent with the priorities and choices made for its operational capabilities. Therefore defence spending will not decrease. During the initial period annual resources (excluding pension charges,) will be constant in volume, that is, increasing at the same pace as inflation. They could include exceptional resources. Then, during a **second phase**, starting in the **year 2012**, the budget will increase at the pace of **1% per year in volume, that is, 1% above the inflation rate.** Between now and 2020, the aggregate effort devoted to defence excluding pensions will amount to 377 billion Euros. In parallel, restructuring will lead to considerable decrease in staff over six or seven years and operating cost reductions in the Ministry and the armed forces. The resulting savings will be totally reinvested in **the procurement budget** which **will increase from an average of 15.5 billion Euros in past years to 18 billion Euros on average per year for the period 2009-2020**, and also in the improvement of defence personnel training and living conditions.


- 13. Defence industry must be European in order for its companies to become competitive worldwide.** Individual European countries can no longer master every technology and capability at national level. France must retain its areas of sovereignty, concentrated on the capability necessary for the maintenance of the strategic and political autonomy of the nation: nuclear deterrence; ballistic missiles; SSNs; and cyber-security are amongst the priorities. As regards the other technologies and capacities that it may wish to acquire, France believes that the European framework must be privileged: combat aircraft, drones, cruise missiles, satellites, electronic components etc., although procurement policy must include acquisitions on the world market.
- 14. The reorganisation of public authorities is necessary in order to take account of this new national security strategy. The Defence and National Security Council** chaired by the President of the Republic will be created. The National Intelligence Council will be one of its major bodies. The Prime minister will be in charge of managing the implementation of the decisions taken by the Defence and National Security Council. The 1959 ordinance dealing with the general organisation of defence will be reformed in order to implement this new strategy. In addition, the role of the Parliament shall be reinforced considerably, in particular as regards the intervention of French armed forces in foreign operations, the monitoring of the orientations of the White Paper and the policy as regards bilateral defence agreements. Parliament plays an important role in expressing the support of the nation for the national security strategy.
- 15. The security of the nation depends on the men and women who choose to serve their country and their fellow citizens.** The goal of the strategy is to enable them to reach **the highest possible degree of professionalism** in all sectors, both civilian and military, and for all types of contracts. In as much as possible, joint training and shared recruitment policies in the various ministries will be implemented. A special course track to train external and internal intelligence personnel will be set up. In every category of the Civil Service, awareness to national security issues will be reinforced in particular for the students of the *Grandes Ecoles* (élite post-graduate schools for high officials (ENA), police officers (ENSP), and magistrates (ENM)). The principle of mobility in public administrations will be instituted for high-potential senior officers.
- 16. Public support is the necessary condition for the national security strategy to be effective.** The White Paper advocates a new impulse in the following areas: training of young people as well as of elected officials; renovation of the Compulsory Defence Preparation Day (*Journée d'Appel pour la Défense - JAPD*); creation of a civilian service corps; organisation of a coherent and attractive array of voluntary organisations to serve the security of France; **strategic research**

both at the national and European levels; creation of a scientific cooperation foundation which could support the European Doctoral School in security studies; reorganisation of the training provided today by four major institutions into two poles (defence & foreign affairs; internal security).









Fifteen prescriptions

1. **Force protection and land combat capabilities** will benefit from the acquisition of new pieces of equipment, such as 650 new generation infantry fighting vehicles (VBCI); 25,000 individual kits for infantry combatants (*Felín*); hundreds of armoured cargo vehicles protecting against bombs, landmines and IEDs; a new long-range rocket taking into account the prohibition of cluster-bomb ammunition; increased responsiveness in the acquisition process via crash programs.
2. **Drones for surveillance and combat drones** are in great demand for air-land operations. Fighter aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles increasingly complement each other.
3. **Nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) carrying conventional cruise missiles** are a priority. Due to their stealth and virtually unlimited range, they represent versatile strategic systems that can be used for intelligence, protection of the SSBNs, escort of the aircraft-carrier or special operations. The White Paper sets a target of six SSNs. Cruise missiles will thereafter be carried by aircraft as well as by naval assets, based on a development emphasising a high commonality between both versions.
4. **Large amphibious ships** (*Mistral* class) have significant amphibious, airmobile and command capabilities. Together with 18 first-line frigates, they will constitute the backbone of the *Marine nationale* missions of presence and intervention. Four amphibious ships of that class should be available by 2020.
5. **Detection and early warning capabilities** represent one of the major innovations to be found in the White Paper. They are aimed at ballistic missile capabilities that could be targeted on France or Europe and include very long-range radars and geostationary satellites. France expects this programme to acquire a European dimension as soon as possible.
6. The air strike component (combat aircraft) will be reorganised as a **single pool of 300 combat aircraft** (*Rafale* and modernised *Mirage 2000*) from both services (Navy and Air Force), with management handed over to the Air Force. This new organisation should significantly increase synergies and the fighting potential of our air assets.
7. The priority given to **satellites** is manifest by **doubling funding available** for military programs (from a base of EUR 380 million in 2008) and by establishing a **Joint Space Command**, under the authority of the Chief of the Joint Staff. The

Air Force will be tasked with the implementation and control of military space assets.

8. **Cyber-war** is a major concern for which the White Paper develops a two-prong strategy: first, a new concept of cyber-defence, organised in depth and coordinated by a new **Security of Information Systems Agency** under the purview of the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN); second, the establishment of an **offensive cyber-war capability**, part of which will come under the Joint Staff and the other part will be developed within specialised services.
9. Intelligence collection depends heavily on high-definition day and night **imagery**, to be deployed as a successor program to the *Helios* satellite series (the MUSIS program). **Signal interception** is just as important and depends on a variety of assets based on land, at sea and in the air. A space-based capability will be added (the CERES program).
10. The White Paper stresses **the importance of civilian and civil-military crisis management operations**. It advocates the development of new capabilities within the ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, by establishing an **Operational Centre for External Crisis Management** which will be responsible for advance planning, execution and termination of international crisis management activities. Specific statutes will facilitate mobilisation of civilian experts belonging to the Civil Service. Inter-ministerial funding of these activities will also be improved.
11. The **nationwide emergency advance warning and information systems** will be overhauled. The current system is based on air-raid sirens. The new system will combine targeted messages via SMS, media or e-mail together with a modernised siren network.
12. The **ministry of Interior** will establish an **Inter-Ministerial Crisis Management Centre** for the direction and control of crisis response operations on national territory. This operations centre will be located within the ministry.
13. The White Paper envisions three public Internet sites:
 - A “public-awareness” site dealing with new risks and threats and preparing the public at large to respond to emergency situations occurring on national territory;
 - A “cyber-defence” site specifically dedicated to prevention and response of cyber-attacks;


- A site dedicated to the research community in matters dealing with national security.

14. The White Paper is in favour of a **civic service** and describes the various formats that could be considered. It also calls for **an expansion of voluntary service**, particularly in the form a “**national security voluntary service**” which could substitute for the current “citizen reserve” and be open to all persons willing to take part on national territory.

15. The White Paper stresses the significance of **national commemoration of historical events**. The most relevant dates are **May 8, June 18 and November 11**. This last date has a special **European dimension** that should be underlined in school *curricula*.

NEW VULNERABILITIES

- Terrorism of mass destruction remains a key concern. Indeed, with the prospect of terrorist groups acquiring unconventional weapons, the scale of the threat may increase.
- Ballistic and cruise missile threats will grow within the timeframe of the White Paper as a consequence of the proliferation of more capable missiles putting a broader range of countries within striking distance of Europe.



- Major attacks against information systems are a rising concern, as the combined consequence of the rapidly growing role of cyberspace in societal, economic and security terms, and of the adoption of aggressive cyber-attack techniques and postures by state and non-state actors.
- New and robust espionage activities will be stimulated by the rise of powerful players in the framework of strategies of influence. In the age of globalisation, such activities will cover a broad range of scientific, technological, economic targets alongside more traditional objectives. Disinformation and strategies of influence aiming to destabilise corporate and individual actors will also need to be countered, using the tools of soft power adapted to our networked world.
- Major criminal networks, including narco-trafficking have become, and will continue to be, a serious security concern. Criminal networks operate across the continents, from the cocaine cartels of Latin America to the heroin traffickers of Afghanistan, with financial resources comparable to those of certain states. Simi-

larly, the trade in counterfeit goods represents according to the OECD some 5 to 7% of global trade and disproportionately affects Western economies.

- Health risks are emerging, flowing from the convergence of urbanisation, cross-border movements of population and the appearance of new pathogens: AIDS, SARS and H5N1 are illustrations of the potential scope of catastrophes, with the prospect of severe consequences in the field of security as in others. Similarly, purely natural catastrophes – earthquakes, tsunamis, droughts, and the like – as well as industrial disasters and technological risks take on entirely new proportions as a result of demographic patterns and the forces of globalisation.
- The number of French citizens residing abroad has been rising, reaching 1.5 million in 2008. European solidarity, as well as specific crisis-planning measures will be two important tools in dealing with the risks run by this large and far flung population group.

NEW SECURITY PARAMETERS

The following have to be factored into our strategy:

- The growing interconnection between threats and risks: This is a direct consequence of globalisation which removes barriers between conflicts and risks, much as it does in benign or positive fields such as trade or communication. For instance, terrorist groups which used to act in a segmented manner prepare operations in several points of the globe, conducting cross-border ideological warfare and attempting to interconnect crises with distinct local or regional roots.

In many areas, such as the Middle-East, Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as parts of central and eastern Africa and around Sudan, there is a real risk of contagion of war. These risks must be dealt with first of all by actions aiming at preventing the appearance or spread of armed conflict. Nonetheless, with the growing speed of the exchange of information, images and ideas – as we have seen in recent years in the religious field – flare-ups can occur, creating a particularly unstable environment prone to sudden burst of violence. Future tensions involving energy, food and water as well as strategic raw materials, can lead directly to major crises in one or several parts of the world. The same applies to the long-term effects of global warming, if preventive action is not taken in good time. These risks of interconnection and the cascading of crises call for large-scale responses, integrating economic, social, environmental, and security policies.



- The continuity between domestic and foreign security

The traditional distinction between domestic and foreign security has lost its relevance. Terrorism in Europe is staged both from the outside and through the infiltration of our societies. Large-scale criminal networks take advantage of borderless globalisation. Energy security cannot be envisaged outside of a global perspective. Information systems are vulnerable regardless of borders. The same applies to natural or health risks.

This continuity has taken on strategic significance, of which France and Europe have to draw the full implications.

Comprehensive strategies, integrating the different dimensions of security are required.

- The possibility of sudden strategic upsets

International uncertainty and instability give plausibility to scenarios of strategic upsets and surprises, differing from those risks for which our defence and security systems have been geared to previously. Apart from terrorism, we find at the heart of these scenarios developments such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber-warfare, the emergence of new weapons as a result of technological breakthroughs. The risk of an attack breaking the “nuclear taboo” can not be ruled out. Many potential major regional contingencies have the potential to degenerate into a world-wide strategic upset. The offensive use of outer-space, applications flowing from nanotechnologies, bio-technologies, massive strides forward in computer technology, new sources of vulnerability of space-based assets, come to mind as well. Other “black swan” events may well arise, with substantial and unexpected strategic consequences.

- Developments impacting military operations.


Military operations of the future will increasingly be conducted for and in the midst of the population, generally in an urban environment. A more worrying trend is that current “peace operations” are increasingly lethal, which puts a premium on force protection. Superior technology does not, *per se*, guarantee operational superiority. The human factor will remain prevalent in complex international operations where all instruments of power and influence are brought to bear.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY


In geographical terms, four areas are singled out as being critical with major implications for the security of France and Europe.

- The arc of crisis from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, characterised by a combination of instability, multiple sources of inter-State and non-State violence, the prospect of proliferation and the concentration of energy resources, against the backdrop of new and disturbing connections between the crisis-points of the region.
- Sub-Saharan Africa, where the existing problems of development are increasingly overshadowed by the combination of widespread State-failure, the scramble for raw materials drawing in new players, runaway urbanisation and the consequences of climate change.
- The situation in the Eastern part of the European Continent with the ongoing quest for stabilisation in the Balkans but also the consequences of the domestic evolution of Russia and the assertion of its political, strategic and economic role in Eurasia with knock-on effects vis-à-vis its European neighbours.
- The prospect of major conflict in Asia the key role of which in the global economy has not yet been matched by the emergence of robust regional institutions to mitigate and defuse the causes of strategic tensions in South and East Asia. The world's strategic centre of gravity is shifting to Asia. Any conflict in the region would have vast consequences for our own prosperity and security.

The main strategic axis:
from Atlantic to the Indian Ocean



★ Current military presence on Western Africa's seaboard



France's European Ambition



The White Paper analyses the hopes and disappointments born out of the European construction. Although it does not minimise the obstacles, it expresses clear support in favour of a European ambition; it proposes concrete measures in order to improve defence, civil security, the security of energy supplies, the strengthening of European defence industry and the training of human resources.

The White Paper advocates the drafting of a European White Paper on Defence and Security.

Since its beginning, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been built outside the Treaty provisions: ESDP is the result of inter-governmental cooperation within the EU council.

The French white paper states that European defence policy is a necessity: the EU has no other choice than shouldering more strategic responsibilities.

The main European issues in the White Paper are:

I. Priority to capability and crisis management

- **Constitute effectively** and gradually **an intervention capability of 60,000 men**, deployable for one year in a remote theatre with the necessary **air and naval components**.
- Readiness to plan for and deploy **two or three peace-keeping or peace-enforcement** operations **simultaneously** for a significant duration and **several smaller civil operations** in separate theatres.

- **Compensate for the weaknesses in intervention capability in distant theatres, in particular by sharing the assets of several European countries such as:**
 - **Strategic and tactical transport aircraft** (A 400 M, creation of a European military air transport command);
 - **In-flight refuelling** (example: the Airbus multi-purpose aircraft);
 - **Mobile-air capability such as helicopters** (upgrading and sharing of European assets on the basis of Franco-British and Franco-German co-operation);
 - **Naval-air capability** (association of aircraft carriers, airbase, on-board air units and necessary escort carriers).
- **Create and support more robust civil crisis management capabilities:** the EU must have the necessary human resources to face growing demands: police, *gendarmes*, judges and lawyers.
- Increase the anticipation and analysis capability by a significantly greater pooling of operation support intelligence
- Insist on the increasing role of the reserve forces, as they play a more and more important part in crisis management
- Reinforce considerably **European planning and command capability**. The EU must have an independent European standing strategic planning capability. The growing number of EU interventions abroad also requires more military operational planning and command capability.
- Take the necessary measures so that military and civil missions carried out by the EU be under a **single strategic Directorate in Brussels**.
- Reform the **funding procedures** for operations outside the EU. In the long term, replace the concept of 'contribute or pay' by the principle of **financial solidarity** amongst member countries. France is also in favour of a significant budget for common foreign and security policy.

II. Develop a European reflex in civilian and military personnel training

The complexity of crisis management operations means that civilian and military personnel from EU countries require joint training. France is in favour of the following:

- The **continuation of initial and on-going training** of both a general and specialised nature (example the Franco-German helicopter pilot school and the *Advanced European Jet Pilot Training*);
- The creation of an **exchange and training programme** for security and defence;
- The creation of a permanent **European crisis management training centre**.

III. Promote a rational and competitive European industry

The White Paper notes that the **mastery of all the technological capabilities at national level is no longer possible**. France must, however, maintain the national capability required to ensure its strategic and political autonomy in a limited number of critical sectors, such as: nuclear deterrence, ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines (SSBNs and SSNs) and information system security.

France believes that as regards other technologies and capabilities that might be required, the **European framework should be privileged**. This is the case for fighter aircraft, cruise missiles, satellites, electronic components, etc. The procurement policy must also be open to purchases on the **world market**.

Stimulating industrial cooperation in Europe means in particular:


- Pursuing **joint analysis of military requirements**;
- **Reinforcement of the action of the European Defence Agency**;
- Defining **joint rules for defence procurement**.

IV. Make the EU an effective player in the protection of its citizens

- **Reinforce cooperation against terrorism and organised crime**.
- Develop European civil protection capabilities: France will defend the creation of a **European Operational Centre for civil Protection**. It will propose to develop gradually European operational capabilities in the field of **civil protection**.

France will also promote the establishment of a **European College for Civil Security**.

- Reinforce **operational cooperation** within the EU against *cyber-warfare*.
- Reinforce the **integrated management of operational cooperation** at EU borders.
- Reinforce intergovernmental coordination for the **security of strategic resources**.



RENOVATING TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

Since its inception, the North Atlantic Alliance has embodied the relationship between North America and Europe. It has played a central role in European security and is essential for the security of France. The White Paper delineates the basics for a renovated strategic partnership between Europe and the United States of America.

The European Union and NATO are Complementary Organizations

The White Paper recalls that there is no competition between NATO and the EU in the field of defence and security; it rejects the frequent temptation to define *a priori* a strict and frozen distribution of tasks between the two organisations. In the era of globalisation, the security stakes are such that each organisation can play its own role with its own methods and its own assets.

The EU and NATO will continue to be complementary, thriving on the value added by each organisation:

- **NATO is an organisation for collective defence which unites North America and Europe, in particular when faced with the risk of major aggression. The Alliance must also provide a response to the diverse new threats that face the allies.**
- **The European Union is unique in that it has the capability of mobilizing a full range of crisis management tools: military, humanitarian, diplomatic and financial to serve the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The EU must not be considered as the civilian agency of NATO; it is a full-fledged participant in crisis management.**

NATO must continue to adapt to international strategic changes

The White Paper notes that since the publication of the previous White Paper in 1994, NATO has changed considerably: after enlargement to 26 and soon 28 or 29 members, NATO has deployed multinational operations and has developed partnerships with countries in numerous regions of the world and has begun to transform the organisation to adapt to new forms of conflicts. This transformation has given rise to some difficulties and debates on mission definition, on enlargement and on the lack of human resources and assets required for these operations.

The White Paper proposes that the debate on NATO renovation be guided by three main goals:

- **Reach a joint assessment of the new threats to be included in the Alliance's mission.**

- **Define better responsibility-sharing between Americans and Europeans;**
- **Stress the rationalisation of planning and command structures.**

The 60th anniversary summit of the North Atlantic Alliance to be held in Strasbourg and Kehl in April 2009 will be the opportunity to launch this debate.

The Evolution of France-NATO Relations

The White Paper notes that there is insufficient knowledge about the *current* position of France within NATO. It emphasises that France has been a member of NATO since its creation and never ceased to be a member.

In 1966, France withdrew from the integrated military structure only, without however modifying its status as full member represented in the North Atlantic Council, which is the decision-making body of NATO where all decisions are made by consensus. France has always been present within the Alliance.

Since 1994, the presence of France has extended throughout the allied structures and, as of 1995 this was exemplified by the decision to attend the NATO Defence Ministerial meetings, and the Military Committee as a full member, whereas it had been previously an observer only. Today, there are only two bodies where France is not represented: the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). About one hundred French officers are posted in the command structures of the Alliance.

France's military commitment in NATO-led operations is considerable. More than 4,000 French military personnel are present in NATO-led operations; the Kosovo operation is at present under the command of a French general and in July 2008, more than 7,000 soldiers will be on alert as part of the NATO Response Force (NRF), in addition to air, naval and command capabilities.


Forty years after France's withdrawal from the NATO's integrated military structure, given the evolution of the situation in Europe, the nature of the threats and the mutations which have taken place within NATO, it is not the relevance of the principle of independence that requires rethinking, but the institutional transposition of these principles within the Alliance.


The White Paper:

- **Emphasises that the situation in Europe has changed profoundly since 1966; 21 members of NATO are members of the EU and have undertaken commitments with France in favour of European defence;**

- **Affirms France's determination in favour of a united Europe, especially in the area of defence;**
- **Considers that our present positioning lacks clarity and should change in order to reinforce our European goals, in parallel with the progress of European security and defence policy.**
- **Considers that a new rapprochement with the command structure of NATO should take place while respecting the fundamental principles of our defence, that is:**

- **Maintaining full freedom of assessment on the part of French political authorities:**
 - **This will result from the priority given in the White Paper to intelligence and to certain defence capabilities which reinforce our strategic autonomy (deterrence, conventional cruise missiles, early warning);**
 - **Full participation of France in NATO does not entail automatic contribution on the part of our nation to NATO military interventions (decisions in the Alliance are made by consensus);**
- **Total nuclear independence of France both in terms of capability and strategy;**
- **Freedom of choice concerning the commitment of our armed forces: specifically, no French armed forces will be permanently placed under NATO command in peace time.**





The United Nations: a central institution




UN Photo Mark Garten

Today threats and natural risks have taken on a **global dimension**: war, proliferation, terrorism, pandemic disease, organised crime, wide-ranging natural catastrophes. All of these threats must be faced by an effective and legitimate international security system.

France considers therefore that it is essential to **reinforce international institutions** to act in favour of peace and international security. Consequently, the White Paper:

- Gives priority to the reinforcement of **multilateralism** which, conversely to unilateralist temptations, remains the founding principle of international cooperation and security;
- Reaffirms the central role of the United Nations and its institutions: the **authorisation of the use of force** by the Security Council is and must be the rule;
- Expresses a commitment in favour of the **reform of the Security Council**, in particular its enlargement to two categories of members, permanent and non-permanent. France supports Germany, Japan, India and Brazil and a fair representation of Africa as permanent members;
- Makes concrete proposals on the commitment of human resources and assets as regards the fight against proliferation and in favour of disarmament;
- Supports regional security organisations which will be able to act on a complementary scale to the United Nations in favour of peace-keeping, disarmament, the fight against terrorism, civil security and conflict prevention;

- Confirms France's support to humanitarian law, the International Criminal Court, and the promotion of Human Rights;
- Affirms that the international community as a whole has the "responsibility to protect";
- Is in favour of limitation of certain categories of weapons (banning of anti personal mines and cluster bomb ammunitions);
- Reaffirms the ambition that the European Union reasserts its status as a key player in global governance.



Source: UN, April 2008, <http://www.un.org>

THE FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY


The goal of the national security strategy is to deal with the risks or threats which may affect the life of the Nation.

Its first aim is to defend our population and territory. The second is to contribute to European and international security. The third is to defend the values of the republican compact which binds together the French and their State: the principles of democracy, including individual and collective freedoms, respect of human dignity, solidarity, and justice.

These aims are achieved by:

- Defence policy, *in toto*. Defence policy has to ensure the security of the nation vis-à-vis the risk of an armed aggression, the fulfilment of our international defence commitments, the contribution of France to international peace and security, the participation in the protection of the population on French soil and abroad in support of the domestic security and civil security organisations.
- Domestic security policy, in matters other than the day-to-day security of individuals and their property, and civil security policy. As part of national security, these policies must ensure on a permanent basis the protection of the population, the functioning of our public institutions and the maintenance of a degree of normality in the country's life in times of crisis, and defend the security interests of the nation against non-military threats.
- Other public policies, and first of all diplomacy and economic policy, insofar as they contribute directly to national security.

A difference of nature exists between security threats resulting from hostile intent and unintentional events, such as natural catastrophes. But the need for anticipation, advance planning, preparation and timely action is the same in both types of instances.



FIVE STRATEGIC FUNCTIONS

Five basic strategic functions will, in combination, allow us to achieve our overall national security:

- Knowledge and anticipation;
- Prevention;
- Deterrence;
- Protection;
- Intervention.

The connection and relative weighting of these functions is subject to changing circumstances and will therefore need to be regularly reviewed. The White Paper will thus be subject to reappraisal every four years.

1. Knowledge and anticipation

If the pivot of the 1972 White Paper was deterrence, that of the 1994 White Paper was force projection (called “intervention” in the new White Paper, for greater clarity). In the 2008 Defence and National Security White Paper, “knowledge and anticipation” – or what can be called “knowledge-based security” – is not only recognised as a stand-alone strategic function; it is also at the heart of the new doctrine. This is the logical consequence of the uncertainties and instabilities of the global strategic situation in the foreseeable future. Citizens are entitled to expect the State to have a strong understanding of international changes and challenges, guiding defence and national security preparations. The capabilities of knowledge-based security underpin all the other strategic functions. Knowledge and anticipation cover five major areas: **(i)** intelligence; **(ii)** knowledge of areas of operations; **(iii)** diplomatic action; **(iv)** analysis of future trends (horizon-scanning); **(v)** information management.



A number of measures will be undertaken as a consequence. In organisational terms: **(a)** the establishment of a National Intelligence Council (*Conseil national du Renseignement*, acronym CNR) chaired by the President; **(b)** the designation of a

National Intelligence Coordinator (*Coordinateur national du Renseignement*) reporting to the President; (c) the drafting of a bill concerning intelligence-related activities; (d) the protection of defence and security-related secrecy and of intelligence personnel; (e) the optimisation of the diplomatic network in order to improve the sharing of information between all agencies; (f) the coordination of horizon-scanning activities within the State on an interagency basis. In terms of human resources, career paths in intelligence will be improved, and an intelligence academy will be established; additional specialists (notably engineers, computer specialists, imagery analysts, language specialists) will be recruited; the acquisition of area expertise will be promoted. In technical terms, a major boost will be given to space-based applications, with a doubling of the corresponding budget.

The technical capabilities of intelligence agencies will be enhanced, keeping pace with information and communication technologies; airborne imagery and interception capabilities will be developed, with a special emphasis on UAVs.

2. Prevention

The aim of prevention is to avoid the emergence or the aggravation of threats to our national security. An effective preventive strategy will rely on a broad range of tools: diplomatic, economic, military, legal, cultural, combined and coordinated at the national and international levels. In the age of globalisation, such a collective and integrated approach is a *sine qua non*.

French policy in this area will involve :

- The development of an interagency monitoring and early-warning system, vis-à-vis both serious local tensions and potential unintentional disasters;
- The improved allocation of effort in our areas of strategic concern; the updating of our approach to defence agreements with foreign partners, with Parliament being involved in the information loop; a comprehensive approach to defence and security cooperation; increased cooperation in favour of the prospective African peacekeeping capabilities, under the aegis of the African Union;
- The reconfiguration of our staging points, with two bases in Africa, one on each of Africa's Atlantic and Indian Ocean seaboard. In the Gulf, our presence will be enhanced, notably in Abu Dhabi;
- The fight against criminal trafficking outside of national and European territory, using both civilian and military means; new technical instruments will be used to track such flows within, and at the outer borders, of the European Union;

- Arms control and the fight against proliferation, by strengthening the relevant civilian and military capabilities, including detection and neutralization tools; these capabilities will be part of our forces “operational contracts”;
- The prevention of unintentional crisis, *inter alia* through the promotion of a European Emergency Sanitary Security Agency and the implementation of the Treaty’s solidarity clause in case of a natural disaster;
- The preventive deployment of civilian and military assets.

3. Nuclear deterrence

Our nuclear deterrent will continue to be fully independent, with the relevant capabilities at the disposal of the President. The French nuclear forces will have two clearly separate and complementary components, in addition to the support environment enabling their independent and secure operations. France will continue to sustain these capabilities over time.

As a consequence:

- The nuclear ballistic submarine fleet will be equipped from 2010 onwards with the M-51 sea-launched intercontinental ballistic missile (SLBM), deployed on our new-generation SSBNs;
- The airborne component will be equipped from 2009 onwards with the ASMP A cruise missile, deployed on *Mirage 2000* NK3 and *Rafale* aircraft, stationed in France and carrier-based. The number of nuclear-capable land-based aircraft will be reduced from 60 to 40;
- The simulation programme, based notably on the corresponding facilities in the field of lasers (LMJ), X-ray analysis and super-calculators will ensure the reliability of our nuclear warheads;
- The preservation of our national missile and submarine competencies, and the improvement on a 2025 horizon, of the range and accuracy of our missiles;
- The overall modernisation of the support environment for our nuclear capabilities, notably in terms of communications.

Our nuclear policy will remain one of strict sufficiency. France has proposed a nuclear disarmament action plan.

**NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT : FRANCE'S ACTION PLAN
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY GOALS**


- The universal ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). China and the US signed the Treaty in 1996, but have not yet ratified it.
- The commitment of all nuclear powers to dismantle the nuclear test sites in a transparent manner, open to the international community. France has dismantled its facility at Mururoa; the test sites of other nuclear powers have not been shut down and dismantled.
- The immediate opening of the negotiations for a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
- An immediate moratorium on the production of fissile materials. France has ceased the production of such materials.
- The adoption of transparency measures by the five nuclear powers recognised by the NPT.
- The opening of negotiations for a treaty banning all short and intermediary ground-to-ground missiles.
- The adherence of all States to The Hague Code of Conduct (HCOG) against the proliferation of ballistic missiles, along with the commitment to implement it.

4. Protection

In view of the evolving threat situation, the protection of our population and territory calls for a major overhaul. This implies the following priorities as part of an all-hazards approach:

- The in-depth surveillance and control of our country and of its approaches as a permanent mission. This will naturally involve sea, land and air capabilities but also space-surveillance assets;
- The integration of overall resilience as a key objective;

- The reduction of our current weaknesses or capabilities-gaps against unconventional threats. This will involve a significant effort in terms of detection, analysis and response to CBRN threats;
- The development of the rapid reaction capability of the State vis-à-vis a major threat, involving new approaches in terms of coordination and management of civilian and military capabilities. A top level political crisis management centre will be set up;
- In-depth cyber-defence, including the intrinsic protection of systems, the permanent monitoring of critical networks and rapid response in case of attacks. A cyber-defence agency (*Agence de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information*, acronym ASSI) will be set up;
- The development and deployment by 2020 of a ballistic missile detection and early-warning capability involving both surface-based over-the-horizon radar and space based assets. Proof-of-concept and interim systems will be deployed towards the middle of the next decade;



- The modernisation of the public information and warning and alert system;
- The systematic preparation of public communication as an integral part of crisis planning and management;

- The modernisation of the operational crisis planning and management system at the national (ministry of Interior) and regional levels, with strong interfaces with our European neighbours;
- The systematic conduct of exercises at all levels of the various respondents involved in major crises;
- The setting of an “operational contract” of some 10,000 soldiers as the military contribution in support of the civil authorities crisis management efforts in case of a major disaster.



5. Intervention

Intervention abroad is recognised as the key determinant for our armed forces structure. Furthermore, civilian assets play a growing role in foreign operations which also need to be factored in. France will commit its forces within an overarching strategic vision, encompassing both civilian and military considerations.

GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE COMMITMENT OF FRENCH ARMED FORCES ABROAD

- The substantial and serious character of the threat to our national security or to international peace and security;
- The consideration, prior to the use of armed force, of other possible measures, without prejudice to emergency situations involving legitimate defence or the responsibility to protect (R2P);
- Compliance with the international rule of Law;
- The sovereign political assessment by France, freedom of action, and the capability to evaluate the situation on a permanent basis;
- Democratic legitimacy, entailing the transparency of the goals pursued and the

support of the nation's body-politic, expressed in particular by its parliamentary representatives;

- France's capability to sustain an adequate level of commitment, the national control of our forces, and a political strategy seeking the lasting resolution of the crisis;

Definition of the commitment's scope in time and space, with a precise assessment of costs.

In the foreseeable future, operations will fall under one of the following types:

- Civilian operations, such as humanitarian relief or civil reconstruction. On French territory, apart from the unlikely prospect of declared war, all operations will be civilian in nature and executed under civilian authority. French military forces and assets will be involved as necessary, in support of civilian authorities;
- Civil-military operations, presumably on foreign soil, in the context of stabilisation or reconstruction. Generally speaking, military forces provide for a safe and secure environment allowing civilian agencies to support local authorities;
- Military operations proper, generally conducive to a new political situation on the ground enabling civilian objectives to be pursued. Such is the case, for example, of peace-enforcement operations.

What is new is that the generic concept of "operations" is applied to all components of the French contribution, be it as part of a military alliance or coalition, as well as within a civilian operation, such as those led by the European Union. This overarching concept allows for an extension of "force generation", in military terms, to providing for the national contribution to a civilian operation, specifically civilian personnel and assets which are more difficult to muster.

Our aim is to be able to prosecute the following military operations:

- "Special" operations on a national basis or in a narrow multilateral framework, in order, for instance, to free hostages or to pursue terrorists;
- "Middle-scale" operations, undertaken in a national framework, such as the evacuation of our nationals in a non-permissive environment, or targeted, selective, retaliatory operations in response of a direct action against our interests, without omitting the admittedly unlikely possibility of operations for the defence of our metropolitan or overseas territory;

- “Significant” operations, in a bilateral or a multinational framework, for peace-keeping or peace-restoration purposes;
- “Major” operations, necessarily undertaken in alliance or coalition, at a substantial distance from our national territory.

In terms of military capabilities, France will be in a position to simultaneously field:

- A major operation of some 30,000 soldiers deployable within six (6) months for a period of one year;
- A 5,000-strong reserve on permanent operational alert, deployable on a separate theatre against a minor contingency;
- Up to 10,000 soldiers available on our territory in case of a national emergency, in support of civilian agencies.

Air capabilities will allow for the deployment of 70 combat aircraft (5 squadrons) capable of sustained high-intensity operations, with attendant air and logistics support.

Naval capabilities will include the naval air group including its full complement of aircraft and its escort frigates and nuclear attack submarines. France will field 18 first-line frigates along with 4 Force Projection and Command vessels (*Bâtiments de Projection et de Commandement*, acronym BPC), versus 2 today. The latter will substantially increase our ability to conduct amphibious operations and to command joint operations, whether national or multinational.

In terms of civilian capabilities, France will develop a “civilian force generation” concept leading to a more responsive contribution to civilian and civil-military operations.



A NEW MILITARY STRATEGY: INCREASED FREEDOM OF ACTION FOR FRANCE

Increasing the freedom of action for France is the core objective of the military strategy as outlined by the White Paper.

This military strategy is part of a larger strategy of defence and national security, encompassing other public policies such as homeland security, diplomacy and economic policy.



Five strategic functions

The **military strategy** to be implemented identifies five strategic functions: (i) knowledge and anticipation; (ii) prevention; (iii) deterrence; (iv) protection; and, (v) intervention.

Two major characteristics

France must avoid dispersing its assets if it intends to be able to act decisively where its interests are at stake. Therefore, its capabilities will **concentrate on those geographical directions** deemed most significant.

In an uncertain and unstable international environment, French involvement in an inter-State war cannot be ruled out. **The possibility of major conflict** therefore must be taken into account when setting forth the force structure of the next fifteen years.

The main strategic axis

For France, the main strategic axis is the high-risk areas extending **from the Atlantic Ocean to the Sea of Oman and the Indian Ocean**, with possible extension towards Asia.



Key parameters

- Multinationality and interoperability

Most of our military operations are likely to occur in a multinational framework. As a result, interoperability with our allies is a prerequisite for any multinational military operation.

- Versatility

Future operations are likely to last and, over time, to evolve significantly. Both parameters: evolution in time and diversity of the many simultaneous dimensions of military operations, require a responsive and versatile intervention capability, covering the full spectrum of operations.

- Force protection

Future operations are no less dangerous than before, quite to the contrary. Casualties on a theatre of operations have a strong impact on national perception and support at home. Protecting the French forces is not only a moral imperative, but also a strategic and tactical requirement.

- War among the populations

Operations occur more and more among and in the midst of populations, which are both the objective and the environment of military and civilian-military operations. Operating in the midst of population requires an appropriate military culture and ade-

quate equipment. The French Armed forces will continue to develop specific capabilities and skills to that end.

- The human factor

Training and educating soldiers, providing them with clear and legitimate goals, is critical to success in the field, now and for the foreseeable future more than ever before. The human factor remains prevalent, as will morale and cohesion of units in combat.

- The quantitative factor

Even for armed forces that have developed all of the above, quantity has a quality of its own and remains a key factor in most operations, whether they take place at sea, in the air or on the ground.

Operational superiority

France will continue to master those technologies that ensure operational advantage over all plausible adversaries.

The emphasis will be on:

- Means of information, communication, space-based assets;
- Force protection, particularly against CBRN and emerging threats;
- Long-range precision strikes;
- The capability to operate in an urban environment, in contact with and amongst the population;
- Naval superiority, especially in littoral waters;
- Air superiority;
- Air mobility (both strategic and tactical).

INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL PRIORITIES FOR 2025



Nuclear systems

The capability to design, develop and produce nuclear weapons, as well as ensuring their safety and reliability, will be retained as a fully sovereign prerogative. Such a priority implies that laboratories, scientific research and production facilities be allotted the human, technical and industrial resources required for our strategy of nuclear deterrence.

Space systems

France is the only European country to have developed ballistic missiles. As both the M-51 missile and the Ariane-V rocket have completed the development stage, preserving our core competencies in such a strategic field is essential to our concept of deterrence and Europe's access to space. France will maintain, on a national basis, the specific competencies it developed in the field of ballistic missiles – specifically, high performance inertial guidance and solid-state propulsion industrial and technological know-how.

For all other activities pertaining to space, satellites in particular, European efforts are too scattered to be effective. France will actively support the rationalisation of European space industry, with a focus on intelligence-gathering, navigational and communications satellites.



Naval systems

Submarine capabilities are of strategic importance, as much for deterrence and intelligence as for intervention. In the latter context, they allow for long-range precision strike and facilitate special operations.

France will retain a national design and production capability for nuclear-powered submarines. All other components of sea power, such as conventional submarines or surface ships, are open to European cooperation.

Aeronautics systems

The credibility of the airborne nuclear component depends on a national capability to develop a fighter aircraft programme and carry out the necessary adaptation of its systems for its nuclear mission.

However, as fighter aircraft programmes are reduced in scope and extended in time, all European actors in this field will be faced, sooner or later, with the prospect of dwindling competencies, and how best to protect them.

France will support the inception of a European military aircraft manufacturer capable of designing future combat systems, manned or unmanned.

France will contribute actively to the implementation of a strategy, both national and European, for the design, production and acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), for surveillance or combat.

Land systems

France will support the emergence of an integrated European industrial capability for land equipment, including production of ammunition.

Missile systems

Missiles in general and cruise missiles in particular, are critical components of our intervention capability.

France will ensure the continued existence of European capabilities in this sector, based on Franco-British cooperation, with the proviso that core national competences will be maintained, in particular all those pertaining to the airborne nuclear component.

Security of information

Increasing threats on our information systems and networks require the preservation of robust national capabilities. The national industry should remain capable of developing its own security products, including high-level encryption. Presently, these capabilities are insufficient in scope and excessively fragmented.

France will launch and support an industrial strategy leading to a significant increase in national capabilities of design and production in the field of information system security.

Electronic components in the defence sector

The national and European technological and industrial base for defence electronic components is fragmented. In order to establish a more balanced relationship with countries which impose their own national regulations in this field, among which the American ITAR regulations. France will support a European approach conducive to the emergence of a European industrial base. The objective is to preclude situations of critical dependency which increasingly restrain our ability to export freely.

THE STRATEGIC USE OF OUTER SPACE



Outer space has become as vital for the global economy and international security as the sea, the land and the air. France, like all its EU partners, opposes the transformation of space into a new battlefield. France will continue its diplomatic efforts to in favour of a code of conduct on outer space activities

Conversely, satellites with their various applications – communication, observation, interception, early-warning, navigation, meteorology etc – have become a necessary component of all our strategic functions. Therefore, France will make a major effort in the field of space applications, in line with our national security strategy.


This ambition will involve:

- **Capabilities:** France will ensure continuity and modernisation of its observation and communication satellites. In 2008, work will begin on the ultra-high resolution MUSIS optical satellite programme, with an operational capability in 2015. France will develop a significant capability in SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) satellites, after the success of our experimental satellites in this field : the CERES satellite system will be completed by the middle of the coming decade. A ballistic missile detection and early-warning capability will be in place by 2020, preceded by an interim satellite system during the coming decade. Particular efforts will be made in the area of space surveillance, involving very high civilian and military stakes, capitalising on close links with our European partners.

Overall, European cooperation will be encouraged in the field of space application, notably in the form of asset-sharing. (*mutualisation*).

- **Funding:** The allocation of defence funds for space applications will be doubled during the coming years, starting from the current annual level of EUR 380 million.

- **Organisation:** Given the importance of outer space for defence and national security, space related doctrine, operations and programmes will be placed under the responsibility of a specific and dedicated Joint Space Command , under the authority of the Chief of Defence Staff. The Air Force will manage our space assets under the lead of this new command.



THE DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

A Defence and National Security Council (*Conseil de Défense et de Sécurité nationale*, acronym CDSN) will be created as a consequence of the adoption of the strategy which makes national security the federating and mobilising objective of government action. Its field of competence includes **all the public policy issues involved in the areas of defence and national security** where the president of the Republic's powers are defined in the Constitution.

CDSN is composed of the President of the Republic, the Prime minister, the ministers of Foreign and European Affairs, of Interior, of Defence, of Economy and of Budget. Other ministers may be convened depending on the subjects discussed; for example, the minister of Justice for the fight against terrorism, the minister of Health for the prevention of sanitary crises. The secretariat will be provided by the Secretariat-General for Defence and National Security (SGDSN).


Specialised groups may be convened:

- **The National Intelligence Council (CNR)** ;
- A restricted Council for issues related to foreign operations and for certain issues related to nuclear deterrence.

The Advisory Board for Defence and National Security.

An Advisory Board for Defence and National Security (*Conseil consultative de Défense et de Sécurité nationale*, acronym CCDSN) will be created. It will be composed of independent experts appointed by the president of the Republic and can call upon senior Civil Service experts. CCDSN will submit opinions and assessments for the President of the Republic and the Prime minister. The various political, financial, operational and international dimensions shall be the subject of contradictory debate and the options will be presented for final decision.

THE DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (CDSN)



National Intelligence Council

The National Intelligence Council (*Conseil national du Renseignement*, acronym CNR) will set forth the major orientations assigned to the Intelligence services (strategies and priorities), conduct planning for human and technical resources, and examine the evolution of the legal framework governing intelligence operations.

The CNR will be chaired by the President of the Republic and will meet in plenary session with the Prime minister, the ministers of Interior, Defence, Foreign and European Affairs, Economy and Budget and in certain circumstances other ministers depending on the subject discussed, as well as the National Intelligence Co-ordinator and the Secretary-General for Defence and national Security who will provide the secretariat during meetings. CNR may meet in restricted format.

National Intelligence Co-ordinator

As designated point of contact for the Intelligence Services with the President of the Republic, the Co-ordinator will supervise the planning of the intelligence objectives and assets and their implementation. He will prepare the decisions of the National Intelligence Council and monitors their implementation. He will chair periodic meetings of the Directors of the intelligence services in order to set forth priorities for intelligence collection and to address requests from the intelligence community. He will

chair the Inter-Ministerial Committees for the orientation of intelligence related technical investments.

NATIONAL SECURITY: A NEW ORGANISATION

The implementation of the national security strategy will result in the creation of new bodies presented below:

Policy Guidance

- **The Defence and National Security Council** (*Conseil de Défense et de Sécurité nationale*, acronym CDSN)

Chaired by the President of the Republic, CDSN is responsible for all defence and national security related matters. Specialised formations of CDSN can be convened such as the Defence Council, the National Intelligence Council and *ad hoc* sessions (crisis management, intelligence, nuclear issues).

- **The National Intelligence Council** (*Conseil national du Renseignement*, acronym CNR)

This will be a specific formation of CDSN which will provide overall guidance, assign objectives and priorities in intelligence matters. The National Intelligence Co-ordinator will work with the President of the Republic and prepare the council's decisions; his task will be to plan the intelligence goals and assets, in particular the annual investment plan and to monitor its execution.

- **The Advisory Board for Defence and National Security** (*Conseil consultatif de Défense et de Sécurité nationale*)

This Advisory Board will be composed of outside experts who will provide independent analyses and assessments to the President of the Republic.

Coordination at the level of the Prime Minister

- **The Secretariat-General for Defence and National Security** (*Secrétariat général de la Défense et de la Sécurité nationale*, acronym SGDSN)

SGDSN will take on the same functions as the existing SGDN, extended to include the wider scope of national security in keeping with the definition in the White Paper.

- **The Security of Information Systems Agency** (*Agence de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information*, acronym ASSI)

ASSI will be in charge of the implementation of a truly preventive and reactive policy in defence against cyber-attack, cyber-terrorism and cyber-warfare writ large. It will be composed of a network of experts in security and information system observatories throughout the territory, established in defence and security zones under the authority of the competent Prefect.

- **The Inter-Ministerial Coordination Committee for the fight against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats (CBRN)**

This body shall reinforce the national effort in the fight against CBRN threats. The Co-ordination Committee is chaired by the Secretary General for Defence and National Security and shall convene regularly the senior defence and security officials of the various ministries concerned. Its task is to ensure the consistency of threat-protection capabilities and the satisfactory execution of research and equipment programmes.

- **The Commission for Inter-Ministerial support to major contracts**

This Commission includes both a civilian and military side and is to coordinate the action of the State in support of major projects for the export projects authorised by the Government.

- **Two Poles: Defence-Foreign Affairs and Interior Security**

The IHEDN (Higher Institute for National Defence) and the CHEAr (Centre for Higher Armament Studies) will be merged to create a single study and training centre. In a similar way, the internal security pole will be created by merging the IERSE (Institute for the Study and Research on Corporate Security) and the INHES (National Institute for Higher Studies in Security).

Crisis Management

- **The Operational Centre for External Crisis Management.**

This Centre will enable the Foreign and European Affairs ministry to manage foreign crises on an operational and inter-ministerial basis regardless of the nature of such crises.

- **The Inter-Ministerial Crisis Management Centre**

Located within the Ministry of Interior in Paris, this Centre will provide the minister of Interior with a reinforced central inter-ministerial crisis management capability for internal crises. This new centre will allow for operations involving police, *Gendarmerie* and civil security forces in the event of a major crisis. It will also benefit from associating all the ministries concerned by the crisis (such as health or transportation) in the same building each ministry being able to manage its own networks in constant coordination with the other State agencies.

- **The European Civil Protection Operational Centre**

France supports the setting up of this centre going far beyond information-sharing between European Union member-States to become a higher echelon in the preparedness and operational management of European civil protection intervention.

- **The National Call Centre**

During a crisis the call centre will provide general and targeted information to the population about the cause of the event, and answer questions and soothe concerns using expert advice when necessary.

The Ministry of Defence

- **The Joint Forces Space Command**

This Command will be under the authority of the Chief of the Joint Staff. Space operations and programmes will come under his responsibility. In particular, he will be in charge of drafting the space operation doctrine. He will monitor the action of the Air Force in its extended authority in the management of space assets.

- **The Ministerial Committee on Defence Investments**

This Committee under the chairmanship of the Minister of Defence will examine the operational requirements that must be satisfied but also the financial and economic information relating to the most important investments within the ministry before they are launched: risk control strategy, forecasted procurement and total ownership costs, overall financial feasibility, procurement strategy (acquisition, public-private

partnership or service contracts), support policy, potential equipment export. It will contribute to a better control of procurement costs.

- **Finance Committee of the Ministry of Defence**

Chaired by the Secretary General for the Administration or by the Director of Financial Affairs, this committee will make it possible to strengthen consultation and interaction between the ministries of Defence and Budget. In this Committee, financial data relating to the military programmes will be scrutinised and a more regular follow-up of the ministry of Defence's investment policy will be implemented by the ministry of Budget.

The ministry of Interior

- **The Central Interior Intelligence Directorate**

It will take over the missions carried out at present by DST (Directorate for the Security of the Territory) and those of the *Renseignements généraux* (General Intelligence Directorate) which relate directly to national security. There will therefore be one single intelligence agency dealing with internal security.

- **Prospective and Strategy Delegation**

This delegation will reinforce the means available to the ministry of Interior for forecasting and appraising every form of medium-term threat that might impact internal security and for preparing the most appropriate response by mobilising the competent departments.

- **Planning Directorate**

Under the authority of the Secretariat General of the ministry, this directorate will be in charge of planning territorial protection, the protection of civilians, information system security, territorial economic intelligence and managing the defence and security zones. It will also be in charge of contingency planning as regards public order and civil emergencies. It is to coordinate the contribution of the ministry of Interior in the drafting of anti-terrorism protection plans.

- **The Committee of Defence and Security zone Prefects**

This Committee will be chaired by the minister of Interior and is to meet regularly with the seven defence and security zone Prefects. The secretariat of this committee will be provided by the Planning Directorate of the ministry.

- **The European Narcotics Survey and Coordination Centre in the Mediterranean**

France supports the creation of such a body at European scale thereby building on the experiment already gathered through the West Indies and Portugal operations centres.

- **A service Specialised in the fight against the Financing of illegal activities.**

This service will be created by the Minister in charge of the Budget and will review and monitor proliferation and terrorism on the model of the American Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

- **The Economic and Scientific Security Council**

This Council will provide a forum where dialogue can take place between the various bodies involved in internal security. Chaired by the Minister of the Interior, it will include the main research bodies, security operators, technical solution industry suppliers and the representatives of the Ministries of the Defence and Research.

Training

- **The Intelligence Academy**

This Academy will develop a basic training course common to all services and agencies, sanctioned by a diploma.

- **The Joint National Training Centre (civilian and military) in the fight against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats.(CBRN)**

This will enable the development of a shared culture and working methods in the highly sensitive and complex field of the fight against the CBRN threats.

- **An Inter-disciplinarian University pole for research in social sciences in security and defence**

It will address all issues related to military matters, from warfare to the new forms of violence in the contemporary world. This pole is to take on the form of a Research and Scientific Cooperation Foundation and support the **European Doctoral School** for research on defence and security issues.

Networking

- **An Inter-Ministerial Prospective Network**

This will link various Directorates in charge of strategy and prospective studies within the Ministry of the Interior (Prospective and Strategy Directorate), of the Ministry of the Defence (Strategic Affairs Directorate), the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, (Policy planning staff), and the Secretariat of State in charge of prospective, evaluation of public policies and the development of the digital economy (Centre for Strategic Analysis); this network will set up a website.

- **An Inter-Ministerial Network of spokesmen**

This network will be composed of crisis communications specialists who will meet and exchange in order to improve crises management and communication capabilities and be ready on call as necessary.

Public Information Websites

- **A website for public awareness-raising** to the new risks and for the preparation for novel, serious events which could impact the national territory.
- **A website for prevention and response to cyber attacks.**